The Use of Summary Contempt Powers by Administrative Agencies by Tresolini, B. John
Volume 54 
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 54, 
1949-1950 
6-1-1950 
The Use of Summary Contempt Powers by Administrative 
Agencies 
B. John Tresolini 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
B. J. Tresolini, The Use of Summary Contempt Powers by Administrative Agencies, 54 DICK. L. REV. 395 
(1950). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol54/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW




In recent years the American public has become more aware of the existence
of summary contempt powers than ever before in our history. The contempt trials
of John L. Lewis, the commitments for contempt at the trial of the eleven Com-
munist party leaders, and other less publicized examples have focused national
attention on the concept of summary contempt powers. Nevertheless, contempt
procedure remains "one of the stepchildren of legal science."' Major problems
concerning the proper use of summary contempt powers have been almost com-
pletely ignored by legal scholars.
The exercise of summary contempt powers raises fundamental questions in
regard to our notions concerning the formal procedural safeguards which have
been established to insure the just treatment of individuals. Our ideas of justice
and fair play are associated with certain long-entrenched practices. In general, the
ordinary requirements of due process of law, which include the right of fair trial,
representation by counsel, adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, form
the basis of our conceptions of what is just and what is fair. In many respects the
concept of summary contempt powers runs counter to these traditional beliefs.
The word "summary" means "short, concise, reduced to narrow compass or
into few words." 2 The word "contempt" was originally used in England to de-
note an act committed in violation of an order or writ of the king or of any of
his subordinate officers. Any such disobedience could result in the offender's
summary attachment.3
Contempt of court is similar to contempt of the king. It is an extension of
the concept that the king could punish individuals for disobedience. Conduct which
interferes with the operation of the court while in session or which causes the
court to try cases improperly and with loss of dignity is usually deemed contempt
of court in its broadest sense.' Although the type of contumacious act determines
* A. B., 1942, Hartwick College; M. A., 1947, Ph.D., 1949, Syracuse University. Assistant
Professor of Political Science, Lehigh University.
1 Parker, R., Contempt Procedure in the Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 40 ILL. L.
REv. 344, (1946).
2 WORDS AND PHRASES, vol. 40, p. 723.
8 HOLDSWORTH, W., A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, vol. 3, p. 391, (1923 ed.); see also
BEAMES, J., A TRANSLATION OF GLANVIL, (1812), p. 36. ". . .When it happens that the Deman-
dent and the Tenant are both absent, then the King or his Justices may at their pleasure, if so
disposed, punish both parties, the one for his contempt of court, and the other for his false claim.
4 RULING CASE LAW, Contempt, § 1; 31 A. L. R. 1225; 5 STANDARD PROC. 366.
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the procedure which is to be used by the court, the legal distinctions are so con-
fused that definite classification is almost impossible.6
The phrase "summary powers" has been utilized primarily to designate the
application of administrative powers in place of, or as an alternative to, the ju-
dicial processes of the common law.' Freund stated that "the term 'summary
power' is used to designate administrative power to apply compulsion or force
against person or property to effectuate a legal purpose, without a judicial war-
rant to authorize such action." 7 In essence, however, the use of contempt powers
by any branch of government involves an exercise of summary powers because
any process which disregards well-established procedural safeguards may be said
to be summary in nature. When considered in the light of traditional Anglo-Amer-
ican concepts, there is no doubt that the use of summary contempt powers con-
stitutes an anomaly.
Judicial and Legislative Contempt Powers
It has been noted that although contempt powers are primarily associated
with the judiciary, the roots of the power are found in the English executive.8
Contempt powers have been utilized by the judiciary on the ground that such
powers are needed to enable courts to carry on their proceedings in an effective
manner. Orderly administration of justice requires that those who persist in dis-
turbing or slowing down judicial proceedings be punished without undue delay.
The courts, on numerous occasions, have held that summary conviction and pun-
ishment by judicial officers is consistent with the guarantee of due process of
law. 9 Although legal scholars have shown that the use of contempt powers is
5 In general, contempts are divided into two basic classes, criminal and civil. In a criminal
contempt the purpose of the fine or commitment is punitive in nature, while in civil contempt
the purpose is remedial for benefit of the complainant. Contempts are also classified as direct
or indirect. Contumacious acts which take place or are committed in the presence of the court or
so near thereto" as to interrupt its proceedings are said to be direct contempts. Indirect or
constructive contempts do not take place in the presence of the court and the contumacious act
usually results because of the refusal to comply with orders or decrees of the court which are
to be carried out elsewhere. See ThOMAS, C,, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, (1934);
RAPALJE, S. TREATISE ON CONTEMPT, (1884); United States v. Pendergast, 39 F. Supp. 189
(1941); Ex Parte Sage, 66 A.2d. 13, (Vt. 1949).
6 FREUND, E., ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY, (1928), p. 176.
7 Idem.,
S See note 3, supra.
9 See, for instance, United Srates v. Wilson, II U. S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); United States
v. Coolidge, Fed. Cases no. 14,858 (1815); Ex Parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 (1885); Toledo News-
paper Co. v, United States, 313 U. S. 33 (1941).
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based largely on an erroneous opinion which constituted no legal precedent, 0
the American courts have described the power as "inherent" in order to prevent
obstructions to the admnistration of justice and because of th-e courts' necessity
for self-preservation."
The doctrine that courts of record possess "inherent" contempt powers sel-
dom has been seriously challenged in the United States, but it is significant that
the limitations placed on the use of summary contempt powers have never been
defined clearly. The lines as to where due process in a summary action ends and
the fine or commitment becomes arbitrary and unreasonable are blurred and
cloudy. That there still exists serious disagreement is indicated by a recent Supreme
Court decision. 12 Five of the justices held that a lawyer in a workman's compen-
sation proceeding was not denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment upon being fined and jailed for contempt. The majority opinion upheld a
judge's action in progressively increasing an original fine of twenty-five dollars
to one hundred dollars and a three day jail sentence because Fisher, the lawyer,
persisted in his attempts to tell the jury something which the judge had ruled to
be improper. Counsel for Fisher maintained that he had not disregarded the judge's
instruction but had merely presented information on a different subject to which
no objection had been taken by the judge. The four dissenting justices felt that
the judge had abused his powers and acted in an arbitrary manner. Mr. Justice
Douglas stated that the lawyer was "the victim of the pique and hot-headedness
of a judicial officer who is supposed to have a serenity that keeps him above the
battle and the crowd. That is as much a perversion of the judicial function as if
the judge who sat had a pecuniary interest in th outcome of the litigation." I s
Also dissenting, Mr. Justice Murphy clearly pointed out the dangers inherent in
the use of summary contempt powers.
:.."But the summary nature of contempt proceedings, the risk of
imprisonment without jury, trial, or full hearing, make this the most
drastic weapon entrusted to the trial judge. To sanction the procedure
when it is patent that there has been no substantial interference with the
trial, where a judge has used his position and power to successively in-
10 The law of contempt in both England and the United States has been based primarily on
the opinion of Sir John Wilmot in Rex v,. Almon, (1765), Wilm. 243, 97 Eng. Rep. The case
did not actually create any legal precedent because it was dismissed before the opinion of Jus-
tice Wilmot was delivered. Footnote (a) to Rex. v. Almon reads as follows: This opinion was
not delivered in court, the prosecution having been dropped in consequence, it is supposed, of
the resignation of the then Attorney General...; but it was thought to contain so much legal
knowledge on an important subject as to be worthy of being preserved. Wilmot contended that
the power of a court to punish for contempt was based upon "immemorial usage." Sir John Char-
les Fox has clearly shown that before the eighteenth century, contempt cases in the common law
courts of England were tried by a jury unless the offender confessed or the offense was committed
in the direct presence of the court. Fox traced the common-law history of contempts in a series
of essays. See especially, The King v. Almon, 24 LAW Q. REv, 184, 266, (1908); The Summary
Process to Punish Contempt, 25 LAW Q. REv. 238, 354, (1909) ; The Nature of Contempt of
Court, 37 LAW Q. REV. 191, (1921).
11 Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924).
12 Fisher v. Pace, 336 U. S. 155 (1948), rehearing denied March 7, 1949.
Is Ibid., at 166.
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crease the penalty for simple objections, is, I believe, a denial of due
process of law. The contempt power is an extraordinary remedy, an ex-
ception to our tradition of fair and complete hearings. Its use should
be carefully restricted to cases of actual obstruction... u,
The doctrine that the contempt power is exclusively "inherent" in the judi-
ciary has been weakened by the fact that legislative bodies have been allowed the
use of the power. Neither House of Congress possesses express powers under the
Constitution to punish for contempt except for disorderly conduct' 5 or failure
to attend sessions on the part of members. 16 However, it has been recognized that
Congress possesses implied summary contempt powers over other individuals un-
der limited circumstances 17 in order to insure the effectiveness of its legislative
authority.' 8
Administrative Contempt Powers
The problem is now presented as to whether this drastic power should be
utilized by administrative agencies.19 It is a matter of common knowledge that
the period of the last fifty years has been marked by an unparalleled increase in
governmental activities. With increasing frequency, Congress has seen fit to
create additional administrative agencies and to expand the scope of powers al-
ready possessed by these bodies in order that complex modern problems may be
solved efficiently.20 Wide powers have been delegated to administrative agen-
cies largely because of the "inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of govern-
ment to deal with modem problems." 2' 1 Administrative agencies must be pro-
vided with adequate means of compulsion to secure compliance with their orders
and to facilitate the examination of witnesses and the production of testimony. If
adequate sanctions are unavailable, effective action will be prevented and the ad-
ministrative process will lose one of its primary values. Although it is recognized
that summary contempt proceedings constitute a single method of compulsion, 22
14 Ibid., at 167.
15 Art. II, § 5, cl. 2.
16 Art. 11, § 5, cl. 1; see also, Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U .S. 1821).
17 For instance, a person cannot be punished for contempt by either House of Congress for
refusing to give testimony in a matter in which neither House has a right of inquiry. See also,
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 389 (1880).
18 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263
(1929); Jurney v. McCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935); see also, for a sound analysis of legisla-
tive contempt powers, Potts, C. S., Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempi, 74 U. oF
PA. L. REv, 691 (1926).
19 As used in this study, the term "administrative agency" includes an officer or tribunal
of the executive branch of government.
20 United States Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report,
Chapter 1, (1941).
21 LANDIS, J. M. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, p. 1., (1938).
22 The methods of compulsion range from the withdrawal of privileges or service to the im.
position of a fine or penal sentence for non-compliance with the order of an administrative offi-
cer. See, for example, Walker v. Dallas Independent School District, 75 F. Supp. 553 (1948)
Furbush v. Connally, 318 Mass. 513 (1945); Rodgers v. United States, 332 U. S. 376 (1947);
Donaldson v. Read, 333 U. S. 178 (1948) ; Lloyd Sabaudo Society v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329 (1932);
see also, White, L. D., INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, c. 35,
(1939), BEYLE, H. C., Ou WAYS OF GOVERNANCE, C. 2. (1948).
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a large number of administrative orders may be enforced only by the utilization
of such a process.
28
Probably a major reason why administrative contempt proceedings have been
given so little attention is due to the fact that federal administrative agencies have
n'ever been allowed the full use of summary contempt powers. Federal adminis-
trative agencies are usually empowered to bring contempt proceedings for the
violation of their orders but the enforcement or execution of such orders must
be accomplished through court action. On numerous occasions this practice has
caused serious delay in carrying out the declared policy of Congress.
2 4
This practice began in the latter part of the nineteenth century when the doc-
trine of separation of powt-rs was still considered inflexible. The earliest case
which was primarily concerned with the power of administrative agencies to
punish for contempt was that of Langenberg v. Decker.25 It was decided by the
Supreme Court of Indiana in 1892. Relying primarily on the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers, the court ruled that the General Assembly could not confer the
power to fine and imprison for contempt upon the Indiana Board of Tax Ap-
peals. The court reasoned that the power to punish for contempt belonged ex-
clusively to the courts and that the power could be exercised by other bodies only
when the constitution of a state expressly conferred such authority.
The leading decision concerning the now prevalent practice was delivered
by the Supreme Court in Brimron v. Interstate Commerce Commission.26 The main
question before the Court was whether or not an appeal to the Court for the en-
forcement of an administrative order or decree constituted a case or controversy.,27
In a five to four decision it was ruled that courts could be called upon to enforce
the powers granted to administrative agencies in compelling testimony, and that
in the enforcement of such powers before a judicial tribunal there existed a case
or controversy. However, Justice Harlan emphatically declared that federal ad-
ministrative agencies could not punish for contempt.
25
23 Parker, R.. supra, note 1.
24 Ibid., p. 346. "However, to say that administrative decisions are to be 'enforced' and 'exe-
cuted' by the courts sounds easier than it is. Any plaintiff, including the United States, who has
a judament against his adversary, may attack the latter's property upon a simple petition. See
also, Federal Trade Commission v. Millers' Nat. Fed., 47 F.2d 428 (1931).
25 131 Ind. 471 (1892).
26 154 U. S. 447 (1884).
27 Under sect. 12 of the Act of February 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 998, (Act to Regulate Commerce)
the Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized to appeal to the proper court for the ". . .en-
forcement of the provisions of this Chapter and for the punishment of all violations thereof. .."
Previously it had been ruled that an appeal to the courts to force the president of a railroad com-
pany to answer questions did not constitute a case or controversy as defined by the courts. In re
Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. 241 (1887).
28 " . Such a body could not, under our system of government, and consistently with due
process of law be invested with authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine
or imprisonment. Except in the particular instances enumerated in the Constitution. . .the power
to impose fine or imprisonment in order to compel the performance of a legal duty imposed by
the United States can only be exerted under the law of the land, by a competent judicial tribunal
having jurisdiction in the premises. . ." supra, note 26 at 385.
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Since the decision in the Brimson case the practice of enforcing administra-
tive orders or decrees through court action has become strongly entrenched.29
That this procedure will perhaps prevail for some time to come is indicated by
the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 provides that federal ad-
ministrative agencies must invoke the aid of the courts in the enforcement of their
subpoenas.30
Although federal administrative bodies have been denied the power to pun.
ish for contempt, some of the states have conferred this power on administrative
agencies. A few states have sought to avert legal objections to the administrative
exercise of contempt powers by granting such authority by express constitutional
provision. The Constitution of California specifically grants the power to pun-
ish for contempt to the Railroad Commission as follows:
"The (Railroad Commiksion) shall have the further power to exam-
ine books, records and papers of all railroads and other transportation
companies; to hear and ctermine complaints. . .to issue subpoenas and
all necessary process and send for persons and papers; and the Commis-
sion and each of the Commissioners shall have the power to administer
oaths, take testimony, and punish for contempt in the same extent as a
court of law."81
The California Constitution also grants the contempt power to the Work-
men's Compensation Commission, 2 and the courts have held that in punishing
for contempt the Commission is in legal effect a court.83
29 In the earlier cases decided after Brimson v. Interitae Commerce Commission the courts
placed certain restrictions upon the subpoena powers of administrative agencies. See Harriman v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407 (1908); Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, 237 U. S. 434 (1915); Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S.
298 (1923); Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1 (1936). In more re-
cent years the scope of judicial review has been curtailed in a nubmer of instances. See, for ex-
ample, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 40 (1938); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.
S. 402 (1941); Endicott-Johnson corp. v. Perkin, 317 U. S. 501 (1943); McGarry v. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 147 F.2d. 389 (1945).
30 Act of June it, 1946 (Administrative Procedure Act), U. S. C. A., §§ 1001-1011. Sec-
tion 1005 (c) provides as follows. "Agency subpoenas au,,hrizad by law shall be issued to any
party upon request and, as may he required by rules of procedure, upon a statement or showing
of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought. Upon contest the court shall
sustain any such subpoena or similar process or demand to the extent that it is found to be in
accordance with law and, in any proceeding the appearance of the witness or the production of
the evidence or date within a reasonable time under penalty of punishment for contempt in case
of contumacious failure to comply." For an exhaustive reviev of the use of administrative sub-
poenas see Oklahoma Press Publishin," Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946).
31 Cal. Const., Art. XII, s. 22; italics supplied. In Van Hossear v. Railroad Commission,
189 Cal. 228, 207 Pac. 903 (1922), it was ruled that the petitioner could not be punished for
contempt because he had shown inability to pay the fine levied by the Commission. See also Allen
,,. Railroad Commission, 179 Cal. 68, 175 Pac. 466 (1918).
32 Art. XII, § 15.
33 Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury. 171 Cal. 319, 153 Pac. 24 (1915). In Western
Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 Par. 491, 493, (1916), it was stated that a
judgment of the Commission did not differ from that of a judge who directs the entry of judg-
ment by the clerk of the court. ... No judicial action on the part of a superior court or a judge
thereof is required to give to the Commission's award the full force and effect of the judgment..."
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In Louisiana the power to punish for contempt is granted to the Public Ser-
vice Commission by express constitutional provision. 34 It has been ruled that af-
ter the Commission has passed sentence for contempt, the courts may review only
the legality of the proceedings preliminary to final sentence and that no appeal
lies from a sentence for contempt imposed by the Commission.35
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission possesses power to punish for con-
tempt "any person guilty of disrespectful or disorderly conduct in the presence
of the Commission while in session, and to enforce compliance with any of its
lawful orders or requirements. "36 In litigation concerning the use of contempt
powers by the Commission the state courts have, for the most part, compared the
exercise of this power with that of the ordinary courts.3 7 A somewhat different
view was taken in the recent case of Vogel v. Corporation Commission." In this
case the court termed the Corporation Commission an administrative agency but
stated that it could exercise contempt powers to carry out its quasi-judicial func-
tions.
As indicated above, express constitutional provisions conferring summary
contempt powers on administrative agencies are found only in a few states. A
perusal of state statutes seems to indicate that in recent years an increasing num-
ber of administrative officers have been granted the use of summary contempt
powers as a result of statutory enactments.
A substantial number of states grant the contempt power to labor arbitra-
tors. 89 The language of the statutes providing for the use of this power by labor
arbitrators does not differ to any great degree from state to state. The Kentucky
statute is a typical example.
. . ."Each arbitrator shall take an oath to fairly and impartially de-
cide the controversy according to law, justice and equity of the whole
case. . .They shall hear all testimony offered by either party relative to
all matters in controversy, and may summon witnesses and compel their
attendance and punish for contempt by fine or imprisonment as justices
of the peace may do." 4 0
34 La. Const., Art. VI, § 4, "The said Commission shall have power to adopt and enforce
such reasonable rules, regulations, and modes of procedure as it may deem proper for the dis-
charge of books and papers, take testimony and punish for contempt as fully as is provided by law
for the district courts."
35 Louisiana v. Meyers, 171 La. 313, 131 So. 31 (1931). See also State ex rel Milling v.
Louisiana, 154 La. 751, 98 So. 175 (1921).
36 Okla. Const., Art. IX, § 19. The Constitution of Virginia also provides for the exercise
of contempt powers by, the Corporation Commission. Art. XII, § 15; see also Reynolds v. Alex-
andria Motor Bus Co., 141 Va. 213, 126 S. E. 201 (1925).
37 St. Louis and Santa Fe Railroad Co. v, State, 116 Okla, 95, 244 Pac. 440 (1926) ; Ex
Parte Sales, 108 Okla. 29, Pac. 186 (1924).
38 190 Okla. 110, 121 P.2d 586 (1942).
39 Ky. Rev. Stat., (Baldwin, 1943), c. 417, § 417; Il. Stat. Ann., (Jones, 1935), c. 109, §
004; N. J. Stat. Ann., (Perm. ed, 1940), c. 40, Art. 19; Mo. Rev. Stat., (1944), c. 6, § 12148;
R. 1. Gen. Laws, (1938), c. 6, § 478; Wash. Rev. Stat., (Remington, 1932), c. 5, § 428; La.
Gen. Stat. Ann., (Dart. 1939), Title 5, c. 1, § 410; Ga. Code Ann., c. 93, § 506.
40 Idem.
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The Board of Tax Appeals in New Jersey has been granted the contempt
power. The statute provides that "the board when satisfied that a person or offi-
cer has failed to obey its judgment although fully apprised thereof, shall have
power, upon procedure and rules to be adopted by it, to attach the delinquent for
contempt and to punish accordingly."'
4
1
In North Carolina the contempt power is conferred upon the Board of Coun-
ty Commissioners for the purpose of compelling the attendance of witnesses be-
fore the board and the production of papers relating to the affairs of the county.
42
A number of states authorize coroners to punish for contempt in order to
facilitate the obtaining of evidence in the performance of their duties. 43
Legislation which grants the contempt power to public service, railroad, and
utilities commissions has been enacted in a number of states. 44 The contempt
power is granted in such instances primarily for the purpose of aiding tht! ad-
ministrative agency in the enforcement of its subpoenas. For example, the North
Carolina statute states that the Utilities Commission "shall have the same power
to compel the attendance of witnesses, require the examination of persons and
parties and compel the production of books and papers, and punish for contempt
as by law is conferred upon the superior courts."'
45
The statutes discussed above are by no means the only ones which grant the
summary contempt power to administrative agencies. The various states provide
for the exercise of this power by other administrative agencies of many different
types.'
6
It is noteworthy that the constitutionality of many of the statutory enact-
ments discussed above has never been contested before the courts. The ques-
41 N. J. Stat. Ann., (Perm. ed., 194o), Title 54, Chapt. 2, § 15. The contempt power has
been conferred upon the Missouri Board of Tax Appeals in similar language. Mo. Rev. Stat.,
(1944), c. 33, § 5123.
42 N. C. Gen. Stat., (1943), c. 153, § 30, The states of Washington and Indiana have also
conferred the contempt power upon their respective boards of county commissioners. Wash. Rev.
Stat., (1932), c. 9, § 4071; Ind. Stat. Ann., (1933), Title 26, § 619.
43 Conn. Gen. Stat., (1930 Rev.) § 255; Cal, Stat. Ann., (1935), c. 45, § 124; Kans. Gen.
Stat., C. 32, § 456.
44 N. C. Gen. Stat., (1943), c. 62, § 13, (Utilities Commission); Vt. Public Laws,
(1933), Title 28, § 6068, (Public Service Commission); Ariz. Code, (1939), c. 72, § 103,
(Public Service Commission): Ga. Code Ann., c. 93, § 506, (26-36), (Public Service Commis-
sion); Tenn. Public Act, (1937), c. 23, § 408, (3059a32), (Railroad and Public Utilities Com-
mission); Tex. Rev. Civil Stat. Ann., (1937), Title 102, Art. 6024, (Railroad Commission);
Cal. Gen. Stat., (1944), c. 115, § 54, (Utilities Commission); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann., (1944), c.
128, § 15346, (Public Utilities Commission).
45 Idem.
46 State Marketing Commission in Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann., (1936), Title 2, § 637;
Superintendent of Liquor Licenses and Control in Arizona, Ariz. Code, (1939), c. 69, § 2611;
Superintendent of Public Works in New York, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York
Ann., (1943), Art. 13, § 134; Commissioner of Labor Statistics in Ohio, Ohio Gen. Code,
(1946), c. 10, § 885; Board of Pardons in Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat., (1930), § 2000; Coun.
ty Boards of Education in North Carolina, N. C. Gen. Stat., (1943), c. 38, § 20; Crime Com-
mission in Tennessee, Tenn. Public Acts, (1937), c. 13, § 4; Board of Police Commissioners in
Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat., (1930), § 490.
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tion as to how often the power is exercised, therefore, is difficult to ascertain.
In a number of instances when litigation arising under the statutes has come be-
fore the courts the constitutional issue has been sidestepped.17
Although summary contempt poweres have been traditionally exercised by
the judiciary, it has been ruled in a limited number of state cases that adminis-
trative agencies possess "inherent" contempt powers. One of the leading state
cases on this matter is that of In re Hayer.48 In the Hayes case a physician was
confined to the county jail for a ten day period because he refused to testify, with-
out pay, before the state industrial commission. The commission had summoned
the physician during an investigation arising as the result of a claim under the
North Carolina Workman's Compensation Act. The court ruled that although the
power to punish for contempt was not expressly granted to the commission by
statute, the power was to be inferred from the statute so that the commission
could carry out its functions in a proper manner. The court stated that "if a wit-
ness in attendance at a hearing, after having been duly sworn, can refuse to an-
swer a question propounded to him which is pertinent to the matters in dispute
between the parties with impunity, then it is manifest that the North Carolina
Industrial Commission. . .is without adequate power to perform its duties pre-
scribed by statute."'
9
A novel approach to the problem is found in a decision of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut. 50 After making an exhaustive analysis of the contempt
powers of administrative agencies, the court stated that the right to examine wit-
nesses and to compel testimony could be exercised by administrative as well as
judicial officers and that the power is distinctly administrative in nature. Said the
court:
"ThL principle on which the power rests is that when immediate en-
forcement of law is essential to its execution, the state cannot permit a
citizen to obstruct, by his disobedience, such immediate execution of
law, and has the power to invest the officer charged with the adminis-
47 See, for instance, Rushing v. Tennessee Crime Commission, 173 Tenn. 308, 317 S. W.
2d 78t (t938). In the Rushing case the court declared that it would not pass on the question as
to whether or not the Tennessee Crime Commission possessed the contempt power, See also,
Jersey City v. Board of Equalization, 74 N. J. L. 753, 67 Atl. 38 (1907).
48 200 N. C. 133, 156 S. E.2d 791 (1931).
49 Ibid., at 794. For other state cases which have held that administrative agencies possess
inherent contempt powers see In re Sanford, 236 Mo. 665, 139 S. W. 376 (1911), in which it
was held that the MiSsouri Board of Equalization could enforce obedience to its lawful orders by
the use of the contempt power even without express statutory authority. See also State ex rel
Farber v. Shot, 304 Mo. 523, 263 S. W. 894 (1934). In this case it was held that the contempt
power could not be conferred on an administrative agency. In Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72,
70 S. E. 781 (1911), it was ruled that the Georgia Board of Police Commissioners possessed
all the powers which were granted to courts of record. See also Branks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga.
460, 170 S. E. 369 (1933) ; State ex rel Dysart v. Cameron, 140 Wash. 101, 248 Pac. 408 (1926).
It has also been held in a number of cases that a public notary may punish for contempt. See,
especially, In re Merkle, 40 Kans. 27, 19 Pac. 401; Noell v. Bender, 317 Mo. 394, 295 S. W.
532 (1927).
50 In re Application of Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 31 A. 522 (1894).
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tration of law, whether he be a judicial or administrative officer, with
authority to complt, in such case of emergency, immediate obedience
in the manner prescribed by law." 61
However, the approach to the problem which characterizes the Clark case
has, to date, never been utilized by any other court.
Some Conclusions
Despite the fact that summary contempt powers have been denied to federal
administrative agencies, the states have been granting the power to their respective
administrative bodies with increasing frequency. In a number of instances state
legislative bodies and state courts have shown little respect for the doctrine that
summary contempt powers belong exclusively to the judiciary. The grants of ad-
ministrative contempt powers also seem to indicate that there is a growing need
to vest administrative agencies with adequate powers in order that they. may func-
tion in a more effective manner.
The experience of the state governments may, in timu, affect the attitude
of the national legislature concerning the grant of summary contempt powers to
administrative agencies. A few legal scholars already have advanced potent argu-
ments for the granting of summary contempt powers to a limited number of fed-
eral administrative agencies. 52
Nevertheless, at the federal level and in a majority of the states, the con-
stitutional arguments against the granting of summary contempt powers to ad-
ministrative agencies are still being used. The doctrine of separation of powers
and the dictum of the Brimson case that due process of law would be violated if
administrative agencies possessed summary contempt powers have usually been
relied upon by the courts in denying contempt powers to administrative agen-
cies. These constitutional objections may be easily dispensed with, however, by
simply terming an administrative agency a "court" or an "arm" of the legisla-
ture. It seems obvious, therefore, that a realistic consideration of the problem
should not involve discussion of constitutional provisions which, depending on
thu peculiar circumstances at hand, can be used to either grant or deny the use
of summary contempt powers to administrative agencies.
51 Ibid., at 524, 525.
62 See especially Albertsworth, E., Administrative Contempt Powers, A Problem in Tech-
nique, 25 A. B. A. J. 954 (1939). The author states that the Interstate Commerce Commission
should be granted the power to punish for contempt in the enforcement of their subpoenas on
the grounds that the older administrative agencies of proven abilities will exercise the power
without abuse of individual rights and privileges in the public interest. And see Pillsbury, W.,
Administrative Tribunals, 36 HARV. L. R. 591 (1936). Pillsbury's main thesis is that the power
to enforce the attendance of witnesses and the giving of testimony does not belong to any one
of the three branches of government. It is rather an incidental power which is deemed necessary
for properly carrying on the functions of each department. For the judiciary to exercise the con-
tempt power exclusively upsets the equal balance of the three departments. Because the legisla-
tive department may exercise the contempt power to a limited degree, then, by legislative dele-
gation, with proper statutory limitations, it could be exercised by the executive department. Com-
pare In re Application of Clark, supra, note 50.
THE USE OP SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWERS
A more realistic approach to the problem would be concerned with the
balancing of public right with private right. Summary contempt powers should
be made available to administrative officers only in those instances when delay
in the prohibition or performance of specific acts of private individuals will di-
rectly or indirectly endanger public rights. However, we must not lose sight of
the fact that the expertness of an administrator is substantive rather than proce-
dural in nature. In most instances he has been placed in his job because of speci-
alized knowledge of a particular business or industry. In the great majority of
cases he must be loyal to the political powers because he is directly responsible
to the political forces. Although administrative officials are usually men of high
integrity, they tend to exalt "administrative convenience and the national ad-
vantage at the expense of the individual and his freedom. The official in his zeal
to achieve a desirable result may impose an unreasonable burden upon the sub-
ject." 58 Nevertheless, it is necessary that administrative officers possess adequate
powers in order that public rights may be protected.
The logical question appears to be: Will the advantages obtained from the
granting of summary contempt powers to administrative agencies outnumber the
dangers to individual rights which may result from the use of the power? Prob-
ably an unqualified answer to the question cannot be given because of the many
diverse types of administrative agencies. In almost every instance in which ad-
ministrative agencies have used the contempt power the occasion for its exercise
involved the refusal of a witness to appear and testify or to produce certain docu-
ments. The practice of invoking the aid of the courts has proved very cumber-
some and ineffective notwithstanding the fact that the courts, in recent years, have
shown a tendency to allow administrative action more freedom from court in-
terference. Although there should be no unqualified grant of contempt powers
to administrative agencies, a beginning might be made by allowing a few agencies
at the federal level to punish for contempt upon refusal to testify on the part of
a witness. In granting such a power, however, Congress should give the maxi-
mum possible procedural guidance to tht administrative official in order to mini-
mize the abuses which might result. In this regard, state statutes which confer
the contempt power on administrative agencies and federal statutory enactments
providing for the use of other ex parte powers"l could be utilized to advantage.
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64 In most statutes which provide for the use of summary powers Congress has failed to
give maximum procedural guidance. There has been no real guidance when it is provided that
an administrator must act with good judgment on "evidence satisfactory to him" or "on becom-
ing satisfied" that certain conditions exist. See, for example, 18 U. S. C. A., § 1461, which pre-
scribes no procedures whatsoever for the exclusion of injurious matter from the mails by the
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C. A., §§ 3693,3701,3312.
